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SUMMARY 
We construct a simple probit model of the determinants of real house price slump endings. We find 
that the probability of a house price slump ending is higher, the smaller was the pre-slump house 
price run-up; the greater has been the cumulative house price decline; the lower are real mortgage 
interest rates; and the higher is GDP growth. Slumps are longer, other things being equal, where 
housing supply is more elastic, but shorter the more developed are financial institutions. For slumps 
of a given size, shorter sharper slumps are associated with worse macroeconomic performance in the 
short run, but with better performance in the long run. This suggests that for sufficiently low discount 
rates, policy makers should not impede the decline in real house prices, and this conclusion is 
reinforced by the finding that after a certain duration, house price slumps can become self-
reinforcing. On the other hand, we also find evidence that during downturns, falling house prices can 
lead to lower private sector credit flows. Policy makers thus face a delicate balancing act. While they 
should not intervene to artificially prop up overvalued house prices, they should ensure that their 
macroeconomic and banking policies are such as to make a bottoming-out more likely. This suggests 
that they should keep real interest rates low, and ensure that banks are well-capitalised. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The housing cycle, Leamer (2007) has argued, is the business cycle.  Exaggeration or not, there is no 
question, in light of the magnitude of the decline in housing prices in the advanced economies, that 
how and when the current housing slump ends will matter importantly for the timing and vigour of 
economic recovery.  But there is high uncertainty about when housing prices will end their descent. 
Prices have fallen further and for longer than in any other post-1970 housing slump.  What can we say 
about when this process might finally come to a close? 
Taking data for the OECD countries from 1970 through the mid-1990s, Loungani (2010) finds that 
housing slumps have lasted on average for 4 ½ years, during which prices fell by an inflation-adjusted 
20 per cent.  Booms, in contrast, lasted just over five years, during which housing prices rose by 40 
per cent in real terms.  Such regularities could conceivably be useful for predicting future behaviour. 1 
 
But “this time is different.”  The most recent boom was longer – prices rose for 41 quarters rather than 
21 – and the run-up in prices adjusted for inflation was three times greater.
1 To understand better 
when the current housing slump might end, we would therefore want an analysis that looks not just at 
average behaviour but also at variations and their determinants – one that exploits the relationship 
between the extent of the earlier boom and the depth and duration of the subsequent slump, for 
example.  The fact that experience since the 1990s has differed also suggests that, in order to 
understand how and when the current housing slump might end, it is important to bring data and 
analysis up to date.  
While previous work has focused on housing booms – when they start, how they grow, and why they 
come to an end – there is almost no research on house-price slumps, the issue of concern today.  And 
there is reason to think that the relationship between price dynamics and their determinants are not the 
same in the expansionary and contractionary phases of the cycle.  Rising prices tend to elicit 
additional construction activity that increases supply, although the extent of this will depend on land-
use policy, permitting practices, and so forth.  But although construction activity similarly falls when 
prices fall, there is less of a tendency to destroy a portion of the existing housing stock.
2  This is likely 
to limit the negative supply response in deep slumps in particular.  The behaviour of homeowners may 
similarly differ when prices are rising and falling.  Homeowners show little reluctance to raise asking 
prices when demand is strong, but hesitate to cut them when it is weak. Price dynamics and their 
determinants may thus be very different during booms and slumps.  It may therefore be misleading to 
draw inferences about how macroeconomic and financial developments – say, faster GDP growth or 
lower interest rates – will affect the likelihood of a housing slump coming to an end from previous 
work on the impact of these variables on prices during booms. 
Then there is the possibility that the broader environment has changed in ways with implications for 
housing markets.  The Committee on the Global Financial System (2006) suggests that the Great 
Moderation, by reducing uncertainty about incomes, employment and funding costs, stimulated the 
demand for long-lived, big-ticket items like homes.  If the Great Moderation is now over, then this 
could have implications for the length and depth of the housing slump.
3  Similarly, the OECD 
suggests that the ongoing deregulation of mortgage and financial markets has altered the relationship 
between housing prices and, inter alia, monetary policy.  This makes it important to look for structural 
changes and, insofar as possible, to bring the data up to date. 
In this paper we focus on housing slumps and how they end.  We bring the data up as close to the 
present as possible.  We estimate models that allow the probability of a slump ending to depend on its 
depth and the size of the preceding boom.  We allow a role for both macroeconomic and financial 
factors, and ask whether and how the institutional environment matters.  And we report a number of 
new findings.  In the penultimate section of the paper we use them to ask a series of question about 




1Again, according to Loungani. 
2Although there are some darkly amusing exceptions to the rule: see inter alia Jenkins (2008) and Streitfeld 
(2009). 
3Ceron and Suarez (2006) similarly document a negative relationship between volatility and the strength of 
housing price increases (see below). 2 
 
2. RELATED LITERATURE 
An extensive list of studies shows that house price dynamics exhibit cycles and attempts to identify 
their correlates. Case and Shiller (1989) and Muelbauer and Murply (1997) show that house price 
increases are autocorrelated: that lagged price increases help to predict current price increases. Other 
papers like Englund and Ioannides (1997), Capozza et al. (2002),Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004) and 
Claessens, Kose and Terrones (2011) study the relationship between house prices and macroeconomic 
variables such as GDP growth, unemployment, interest rates and inflation. There are also studies of 
the relationship between prices and housing-specific variables like the volume of transactions and 
time on the market (Stein 1995, Krainer 2001, Glindro et al 2011). 
Other studies closer to our own attempt to distinguish price dynamics in different subperiods.  Using a 
two-state Markov model with country-specific dynamics, Ceron and Suarez (2006) find that prices are 
characterized by a low-volatility state with high house-price growth and a high-volatility state with 
slower price increases.  The average duration of these high- and low-volatility phases is 6 and 6 ½ 
years, respectively, and switches from low- to high-volatility states typically precede or coincide with 
peaks in house prices. Controlling for latent factors and macroeconomic variables, the authors confirm 
the Case-Shiller-Muelbauer-Murply finding that house prices exhibit significant autocorrelation. 
Other papers relate housing prices to financial-market conditions. Bordo and Jeanne (2002) show that 
boom-and-bust episodes are more frequent in housing than equity prices.
4 Using data for 13 advanced 
economies, Borio and McGuire (2004) estimate probit models to assess the probability of a house 
price peak, finding that house-price peaks follow equity price peaks with a lag of roughly two years.  
Moreover, positive shocks to interest rates increase the likelihood of a house price peak. Finally, the 
magnitude of the subsequent slump is larger the greater was the preceding cumulative house price 
increase, and the larger are cumulated financial imbalances, as measured by unusually rapid and 
sustained credit and equity price growth during the boom phase.
5 
Another group of studies focuses on influence of housing finance. Zhu (2006) finds that house prices 
behave more like asset prices in countries where mortgage markets are better developed; they are 
more responsive to changes in economic conditions, including equity-market innovations.  IMF 
(2008) asks whether mortgage-market and financial-market development generally have altered the 
relationship between housing and the business cycle. It concludes that  increased use of real estate as 
collateral has tightened the connection between spending and housing prices.  It shows that monetary 
policy has a larger impact on house prices in countries with more developed mortgage markets.
6  
                                                            
4In addition, banking crises usually occur at the peak of the housing boom or soon thereafter, reflecting the 
involvement of banks in housing finance.  This is in line with the evidence reported by Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2009), especially for major banking crises, where major banking crises means their “Big Five” crises (Spain, 
1977; Norway, 1987; Finland and Sweden, 1991; and Japan 1992).  In a study for Norway, Gerdrup (2003) 
similarly provides a long-term perspective on the links between banking crises in the 1890-1993 period and the 
boom and bust in house prices. 
5 Van den Noord (2006) similarly studies the determinants of house price peaks in advanced countries. He finds 
that house prices have tended to co-vary more closely across countries over time, and that global factors 
(notably increases in global liquidity) have played an increasingly important role in both country-specific and 
common trends. 
6 Something that in turn amplifies the impact of monetary policy on consumption and output. 3 
 
Finally it suggests that shocks to home prices have a larger impact on macroeconomic activity in 
countries with more developed markets.
7 
The only paper of which we are aware focusing specifically on housing slumps is Carson and Dastrup 
(2009).  Comparing house-price falls across U.S. metropolitan areas, they find that a significant 
fraction of the variation can be explained by new construction, lending behaviour, and demographics.  
Relatively large slumps occur in places with larger preceding increases in house prices, a higher 
percentage of high priced and/or low quality loans, and faster increases in building relative to the 
increase in the workforce before the onset of the slump. 
The literature thus suggests that in attempting to answer the question of how and when housing 
slumps end, we should start by focusing on earlier price developments, macroeconomic variables, 
financial conditions, and the structure of housing and mortgage markets.  It is to the basics of this task 
that we now turn. 
3. WHEN DO HOUSING SLUMPS END? 
The first important step is defining house-price slumps.  We define slumps using a cycle-dating 
method analogous to that of van den Noord (2006).
8 We identify the start of a slump as the period 
when the house price index, adjusted for inflation, reaches a local maximum, and its end as when it 
reaches a local minimum. For the latter, we also require that inflation-adjusted prices rise on average 
over the four subsequent quarters. In contrast to the literature on house-price run-ups that generally 
takes 15 per cent as the minimum relative price increase needed to define a boom, we do not require 
house prices to fall below a threshold level in the course of a slump.
9 
Figure 1 shows inflation-adjusted house price indices in 18 advanced countries over from 1970 
through 2010.
10  Vertical lines indicate the end of house price slumps as we define them. The figure 
underscores the heterogeneity of price dynamics, although there are some interesting commonalities. 
Many countries exhibit a house price peak at the end of the ‘eighties or beginning of the ‘nineties, 
while some countries (e.g. Germany and Japan) present unusually persistent house price declines.   
Our method identifies 55 slumps with both start and end dates, and 4 slumps that are ongoing at the 
time of writing (Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain and the United States). Table 1 lists these, together 
with the declines in inflation-adjusted prices and the average house price growth rate in the four 
quarters following the end of each slump.  The current crisis triggered persistent house price falls in 
                                                            
7Other papers study what determines the development, rather than the consequences, of housing finance 
(Warnock and Warnock 2008). 
8However, he implements this method to date house price peaks. Another paper using a similar dating procedure 
is Girouard et al. (2006). 
9 Since house prices display downward stickiness, imposing such a threshold would eliminate a number of 
potentially interesting episodes.  Van der Noord (2006) argues that owners of existing homes tend to withdraw 
from the market, rather than experience a capital loss, and builders usually reduce the housing supply in bad 
times. Below we perform a robustness check where we impose a minimum fall of at least 15 per cent and show 
that our results carry over. 
10 Quarterly inflation-adjusted house price data are used throughout. 4 
 
13 of the 18 countries in the sample, including the four above-mentioned slumps which are still 
ongoing.
11 
To study how different covariates affect the probability of house price slumps ending, we estimate the 
probit model Prob  Y 1 |       ϕ t dt
 ′ 
    Φ     ′  , where ϕ and Φ are the normal density and 
distribution functions, respectively.   is our dependent variable, a dummy variable that takes the 
value   1  at each slump end and   0  otherwise.   is the vector of coefficients measuring the 
impact of the explanatory variables included in   on the probability of house prices bottoming out. 
  indicates our core explanatory variables. The first is the cumulative rise in house prices prior to the 
slump. This is the percentage price change between the preceding local minimum and maximum (the 
latter coinciding with the start date of the slump). It is designed to capture the intuition of, inter alia, 
Borio and McGuire (2004) that the duration of a house price bust should be related to the size of the 
immediately preceding boom.
12 If slumps involve the realignment of prices to sustainable long-term 
levels, then the probability of their ending will depend on how much of the price adjustment has taken 
place. As a second explanatory variable we therefore include the cumulative house price fall during 
the slump. Previous studies having reported a tight relationship between house prices and the business 
cycle, we include GDP growth as a third explanatory variable. Our fourth variable is the mortgage 
interest rate, as a measure of the cost of housing finance.
13 In addition,   includes fixed effects, to 
control for time-invariant country-specific heterogeneity.
 14  
3.1. BASELINE RESULTS 
The first column of Table 2 shows the coefficients associated with these variables, while the other 
columns report semi-elasticities at different points of the distribution.
15 As expected, the impact of 
previous house price booms on the probability of the slump ending in the current quarter is negative. 
However, the coefficient is statistically insignificant. The cumulative house price fall has a positive 
effect on the probability of the slump ending.  In contrast, this coefficient is significant.  A 1 
percentage point increase in the cumulative fall (relative to the level at the start of the slump) 
increases the probability of bottoming out by 3.8-4.3 per cent.
16 
GDP growth has a negative effect on the duration of the slump, as anticipated.  A 1 percentage point 
increase in GDP growth rates raises the probability of bottoming out in the current quarter by 32 to 35 
per cent. Again, this variable is statistically significant at the 1 per cent confidence level. Financial 
conditions also matter.  Higher mortgage rates raise the likelihood of the slump continuing. More 
                                                            
11Although some of these housing markets are currently showing signs of recovery, we do not include the end of 
these episodes in the sample, since there is still not enough evidence of recovery (four quarters in which prices 
rise on average) for us to declare a definitive end to the slump. 
12Something that is most plausible if the preceding boom is accurately characterized as a bubble, during which 
unsustainable increases in prices occurred. 
13We take mortgage interest rates from the IMF IFS and deflate these using private consumption prices. 
However these data are not available for all time periods. In periods where they are missing, we interpolate 
using inter-bank interest rates (the correlation coefficient between the two interest rates is 0.72). We later 
perform a series of robustness checks using different interest rate measures, and find that our qualitative and 
quantitative results are basically unaltered. 
14Unless otherwise stated. 
15Since this is a non-linear model, the impact of a change in each exogenous variable depends on the point at 
which the marginal effects are evaluated. Here we report the marginal effects (semi-elasticities) evaluated at the 
variables' mean, median, and 10
th and 90
th percentiles. 
16Recall that all prices are in real (inflation-adjusted) terms. 5 
 
specifically, a 1 percentage point increase in the real mortgage rate reduces the probability of a slump 
ending by 17.5-19.5 per cent. 
In summary, the baseline model suggests that the probability of a housing slump ending depends on 
how much price adjustment has occurred, on the health of the economy, and on financial conditions. 
While the predictive power of the model is low, this is to be expected, given the small number of 
slump ends relative to the sample size.
17 
We can use these results and the latest available information on the four explanatory variables to 
estimate the probability that housing-price slumps have now come to an end in the four countries 
where slumps are still ongoing.
18 Table 3 shows these estimates, with column (1) reporting the slump 
end probabilities in each country. Since such point estimates are subject to a wide margin of 
uncertainty, Figure 2 therefore plots the simulated density functions of slump end probabilities. Table 
3 suggests that there is now a statistically significant likelihood of slumps ending in Spain and in the 
U.S. That said, even in the United States, where the point estimate of the probability of bottoming out 
is highest, it is still less than 20 per cent. Figure 2 shows that the probability that the US slump has 
ended is not above 40 percent.  
The point estimates of Table 3 also suggest a 12 per cent probability of the slump ending in Ireland, 
but this result is only statistically significant at the 10 per cent confidence level. While the distribution 
function in Figure 2 suggests that the probability of an Irish slump end may be larger, the likelihood 
of this being the case is very small. 
We can also use our baseline results to see how these predicted probabilities would change, under 
alternative macroeconomic scenarios. What happens to them if GDP growth recovers strongly, or 
alternatively if there is a double dip recession? And how will changing interest rates influence the 
probability of house price slumps ending? 
To get a handle on how GDP growth affects these probabilities, we simulate probabilities using the 
best and worst GDP growth rate performances in our country sample. In recent years these were both 
to be found in Ireland, with the values of -2.35% and 2.37% corresponding to 2008 and 2000, 
respectively.
19 Columns (2) and (3) report these probabilities, with other explanatory variables set at 
their latest value in each country. 
As expected, a GDP contraction leads to a large reduction in the probability of slump ends: 
probabilities fall by a half or more in all countries, relative to the baseline scenario, with end 
probabilities in Ireland and the Netherlands becoming statistically zero. The largest proportional 
                                                            
17  We evaluated this using a variety of measures: McFadden's R
2 (0.09), McKelvey and Zavoina's R
2 (0.16), 
Maximum Likelihood R
2 (0.03), Cragg & Uhler's R
2 (0.10) and Efron's R
2 (0.03) and Count R
2 (0.95). 
18  Of course, this assumes that the model continues to apply in current circumstances, and that there has not 
been a structural break in the relationships between these variables as a result of the current crisis. We have 
estimated our models excluding the current crisis and find that the relationships are consistent with those 
reported here (see also footnote 49), but are aware that this cannot definitively exclude the possibility of such a 
break. (The main difference that we find is that excluding the current crisis, the impact of mortgage interest rates 
becomes smaller, suggesting that insofar as there has been a structural break this has been in the direction of 
making interest rates more important in determining when slumps end.) 
19 It is important to take into account that these upper and lower bounds are chosen purely to give an indication 
of the magnitude of possible effects. The same comment applies to the upper and lower bound interest rates used 
later. 6 
 
declines are in Ireland and the U.S.
20 Similarly faster GDP growth leads to an increase in these 
probabilities of 50% or more. Again, the U.S. exhibits the largest proportional increase in the slump 
end probability. This suggest that after conditioning on country-specific values of cumulative house 
price adjustment, previous price run ups and the latest mortgage interest rate, the link between GDP 
and house prices is tighter in the U.S. than in the other countries currently experiencing housing 
slumps. Figure 3 shows that different scenarios for GDP growth rates shift the distribution of slump 
end probabilities and also alter their shape. For instance, larger GDP growth rates are associated with 
flatter probability distributions. 
Columns (4) and (5) report the simulated probabilities for the lowest and highest real mortgage 
interest rates in our sample, 0.07% and 9.14%. Table 3 shows that the scenario with the low interest 
rate is typically associated with a higher probability of slump ends, with the probability distribution 
becoming flatter and shifting to the right (Figure 3). As before, the U.S. exhibits the largest 
proportional increase. For completeness, we also present a scenario using the larger interest rate. As 
can be seen, this dramatically reduces the probability of house prices bottoming out in all four 
countries.  
We conclude that the probability of house price slumps bottoming out is very sensitive to changes in 
GDP growth rates and mortgage interest rates. While the current probability of house price slumps 
ending is not particularly large, even on optimistic assumptions about growth and interest rates, these 
probabilities can fall a lot if GDP growth turns negative or interest rates are increased. Equally, they 
can rise a lot if GDP growth increases or mortgage interest rates are reduced. The latter result is of 
particular significance for policy makers, of course, since they have some control over interest rates. 
We have also found that housing markets in the U.S. and Ireland appear to be more responsive to 
shifts in GDP growth and interest rates. 
3.2. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
We check the robustness of the baseline results following several strategies.  
As a first pass, we estimated a linear probability model and found that our qualitative findings also 
emerge in this alternative empirical strategy.
21  Next, we excluded the country-specific fixed effects.  
As noted, our baseline specifications include fixed effects to control for the country-specific 
heterogeneity not captured by the explanatory variables. When the cross-section dimension is large 
relative to the time dimension, fixed effects may lead to an incidental parameters problem (Greene 
2003), since the fixed-effects estimator is inconsistent and biased away from zero when group sizes 
are small. The baseline results are mainly unaffected by excluding them (column (2), Table 4). To 
control for global trends, we estimate the models including year fixed effects in column (3), finding 
that most of the baseline qualitative results carry over. The only exception is for the house price run-
up variable. This now becomes statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. 
Readers may worry about simultaneity between output growth and the probability of a housing slump 
coming to an end.  We therefore estimated a probit model using instrumental variables in which 
                                                            
20 We compute the proportional change as the ratio between the change in the probability of slump end and the 
change in GDP or the interest rate. 
21 This approach has the advantage of producing coefficients which are easily interpretable. However, its main 
flaw is that, unless vector is severely restricted, it cannot be a good description of the population response 
probability. Predicted probabilities generated by this model can be either greater than one or negative. 7 
 
current GDP growth was instrumented with the trade-weighted average of foreign countries’ GDP 
growth plus its own four lags. Column (4) reports the estimates produced by a maximum likelihood 
estimation procedure.
22 Reassuringly, these models yield point estimates for GDP that are similar to 
those in the baseline specification. We also checked whether the exclusion of GDP may have an 
impact on the point estimates of the other coefficients by estimating the probit model excluding GDP 
growth from the list of explanatory variables. As shown in column (5), this does not significantly alter 
the size of the other variables’ coefficients. 
Additional tests focus on the definition of slump ends and interest rates.  We consider a forward-
looking version of the baseline empirical specification in order to estimate the probability of the end 
of a slump happening in the near future.  We use a dummy variable that takes the value one not only 
at the end of the slump but also in the preceding one or two quarters. This is one way of reducing the 
arbitrariness surrounding the dating of the slump end.
23  These estimates are reported in columns (2)- 
(3) of Panel B.  They are consistent with what we report above, the main difference being that the 
coefficient on GDP growth becomes smaller and statistically insignificant. In addition, the 
coefficients associated with the preceding house price run up now become statistically significant at 
the 5 percent level.
24 
Column (4) presents a version of the model that excludes the four slumps that are still ongoing and 
shows that our results are unaltered. Column (5) limits our analysis to slumps with at least a 15 per 
cent fall in house prices. Again, the results carry over, the main difference being that all coefficients 
are larger and that the performance of the model improves significantly. The pseudo R
2 rises from 0.1 
to 0.24, and the statistical significance of the house price run-up variable improves. This makes sense, 
since larger slumps are more likely to have been preceded by, and driven by, housing bubbles. 
We also estimate models using alternative interest rate measures: nominal mortgage rates and nominal 
and real long- and short-term government bond yields. As before, the probability of a slump coming 
to an end increases when there is a reduction in the interest rate. This result holds for all interest rate 
measures.
25 Indeed, interest rates seem to be the most robust of all our explanatory variables, which is 
important since as noted earlier interest rates are the variable in our baseline model over which policy 
makers have the greatest control. 
                                                            
22 We also estimated the Newey's minimum chi-squared estimator that estimates the probit model in two steps, 
as an alternative IV approach. This approach yields similar results to those of the Maximum Likelihood 
approach. Different tests for the validity and strength of instruments show that it is appropriate to instrument 
GDP growth with a trade-weighted average of the rest-of-the-world GDP growth and with its own lags. We 
checked whether these correctly span the endogenous variables with the Kleibergen-Paaprk LM statistic 
(underidentification test) and find that the system is identified with a Kleibergen-PaaprkChi-sq statistic of 57.90 
and associated p-value of 0.0000. We also conducted a weak identification test. Here we reject the null 
hypothesis of weak identification with a Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic of 51.60 and Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F 
statistic of 35.27. These statistics are larger than the Stock-Yogo (2005) tabulated critical values. 
23 Something that may be of particular importance in the context of quarterly data (van der Noord 2006). 
24 We also estimated models for different forecast horizons to check whether the explanatory variables in the 
baseline specification do a good job in predicting directional changes in house prices happening in quarter .  is 
the current quarter and  are the forecast horizons. (Note that  in our baseline specification.) Our finding is that 
most of the coefficients’ signs do not change.  The exception is the effect of GDP growth, which exhibits a 
small, negative and statistically insignificant coefficient when . By contrast, the interest rate is a good predictor 
for slump ending in  or : this is the most robust of our variables predicting slump ends. 
25To conserve on space, we do not report these models. However, they are available upon request from the 
authors. 8 
 
As an additional robustness check, we estimate a Cox proportional hazard model of the form: 
ℎ   |    ℎ    exp       ; where ℎ     is the hazard function, ℎ     is the baseline hazard,   
denotes time,    are the core explanatory variables used in the baseline probit model and    the 
associated coefficients.
26 This takes into account the fact that, since slump ends occur at given times, 
these can be ordered and the analysis can be performed using that resulting ordering exclusively. The 
advantage of this approach is that we do not have to make a particular assumption regarding the 
distribution of slump ends, i.e. on the shape of the baseline hazard function ℎ    .
27 The disadvantage 
is that, given our small slump sample, the coefficient estimates are likely to be less precise than those 
that could be estimated with a parametric duration model. However, the latter requires an explicit 
assumption for the slump length distribution.
28 
The results, in Table 5, show that the likelihood of a slump ending increases when GDP grows faster 
and when the interest rate falls. However, we do not find statistically significant effects for either the 
house price run-up or the cumulative house price decline variables.
29 
Ceron and Suarez (2006) having noted that high volatility is associated with weak housing prices, we 
therefore examined the influence of housing-price volatility on the probability of a slump ending.  Our 
volatility measure is a backward-looking coefficient of variation computed over the two preceding 
years. While the impact of volatility on the probability of prices bottoming out is indeed negative, its 
effect is small.  If volatility doubles, the probability of bottoming out falls by just 1 per cent (Table 6, 
Panel A, column 1). 
Borio and McGuire (2004) suggest that when prices have been falling for an extended period, 
expectations of further price falls may become entrenched.  To test this, we augment the baseline 
specification by including linear and quadratic trends in columns (2) and (3), respectively.  The 
positive coefficient on the linear trend indicates that the length of the slump to date affects the 
probability of its ending positively, other things equal.  Column (2) shows that lengthening it by 1 
quarter (relative to the mean duration of 14 quarters) raises the probability of prices bottoming out by 
9.2 per cent.  For the model in column (3) we find that the coefficient on the linear trend increases. 
This implies that lengthening the slump by 1 quarter increases the probability of bottoming out by 
14.3 per cent. However, the negative coefficient on the quadratic term indicates that this relationship 
weakens with time and ultimately reverses. This is consistent with the observation that experience of 
Germany, Japan and Switzerland suggests that house price slumps can be extremely long-lasting once 
they become entrenched. 
                                                            
26Another option could be to put the slump duration on the left hand side and estimate a model by ordinary least 
squares.  This would be problematic, however, since we would be assuming that the distribution of the residuals 
is normal. The duration of the slump conditional on the set of explanatory variables would be assumed to follow 
a normal distribution, which implies allowing slumps to have negative duration. Instead we estimate a duration 
model which allows us to relax the normality assumption. 
27However, whatever the shape is, it is assumed that it is the same for all slumps, and that it does not change 
over time. 
28 For more details on the Cox proportional hazard model see Green (2003) and Cleves et al (2004). 
29 The loss of statistical significance and change of sign of the cumulative house price fall is associated with the 
fact that the Cox model uses a different measure for the cumulative house price fall. The reason for this is that 
the Cox model assumes that the explanatory variables are time independent. We follow the standard approach 
and interact with a linear time trend the only variable that does not pass the proportional hazard assumption, i.e. 
the cumulative house price fall. As a result, the coefficients associated with this variable in the probit model and 
in the Cox model are not directly comparable. 9 
 
We also experimented with including the cumulative price decline squared along with the cumulative 
price decline. The rationale for this specification is to look for evidence showing that slumps become 
self-perpetuating not after a certain period of time but after prices have fallen by a certain extent.  
There is little support for this alternative formulation. From the results in column (4) it appears that it 
is the length rather than the depth of a slump that can lead to it becoming self-perpetuating. 
Earlier studies having implied a link between stock markets and house prices, we add the growth of 
total stock market return indices (columns 1-3 of panel B in Table 6). As expected, we find that the 
likelihood of house slumps ending is positively correlated with the stock market. In addition, future 
growth in stock market returns helps predict the probability of house slumps coming to an end in the 
current quarter.  
Inspired by Reinhart and Reinhart’s (2008) observation that capital inflows can fuel house price 
increases, we add the current account scaled by GDP to the specification in column (4) of panel B. 
The sign of the current account balance is positive, indicating that current account surpluses (capital 
outflows) are associated with an increase in the probability of house prices bottoming out. This is in 
contrast with the finding of the related literature that capital inflows are associated with house price 
run-ups. Since this is an unexpected result, we tried different empirical specifications to gain a better 
understanding of this effect. We estimated a simple dynamic model using house prices as the 
dependent variable and the current account balance as an explanatory variable, together with GDP 
growth and the interest rate as in the baseline specification.
30 We did this using the full sample (i.e. 
estimating the relationship across the different phases of the housing cycle), and we also conditioned 
the effect of the current account on the phase of the house cycle. We implemented this by including a 
dummy variable for house slumps, together with an interaction term with the current account. 
When we estimate the relationship between the current account and house prices over the cycle as a 
whole, the current account is statistically insignificant. However, when the impact of the current 
account is conditioned on being in a slump, we obtain statistically significant effects, whose sign 
depends on the state of the cycle. During periods where house prices are not slumping, we find 
evidence suggesting that current account deficits (capital inflows) are associated with house price 
increases, consistent with the findings of the related literature. In line with our previous results for the 
probit model, however, the effect of the current account is the opposite when house prices are 
slumping.  
Thus far, our study of the determinants of slump ends has mainly focused on developments within 
each country and, as discussed above, on the role of external factors such as capital inflows. Now we 
ask how house prices abroad affect the probability of slumps coming to an end at home. To this end, 
we include the average house price growth rate in other countries as an additional explanatory 
variable in column (5) of panel B. We find that house prices abroad are positively correlated with the 
likelihood of a house price slump coming to an end in the domestic economy. Specifically, a 1 
percentage point increase in the rest-of-the-world unweighted average house price growth rate 
(relative to its mean) increases the probability of a slump ending by 25 per cent. 
Since capital flows and developments in foreign housing sectors both seem to affect slump ends, we 
modify the previous specification to combine international financial linkages and foreign house price 
developments simultaneously. The conjecture is that innovations in foreign housing sectors are 
transmitted internationally through financial linkages. Specifically, we study the extent to which the 
                                                            
30These models are available upon request from the authors. 10 
 
correlation between house prices across countries is determined by the intensity of cross-border 
bilateral financial linkages. To this end, we construct a rest-of-the-world house price measure as a 
weighted average of house price growth in foreign countries, using cross-border bilateral bank data to 
construct time-varying bilateral weights.
31 
If the primary impact of foreign house prices comes via financial linkages, we would expect that the 
coefficient on the weighted average of foreign house prices exceeds the coefficient on the unweighted 
average; this was not what we find in column (6) of panel B. As in the previous case, the coefficient 
associated with this rest-of-the-world measure is positive and statistically significant. However, now a 
1 percentage point increase in the rest-of-the-world house price growth, relative to its mean, increases 
the probability of house prices bottoming out in the home economy by just 19 per cent, as opposed to 
25 per cent. That said, the difference between these two estimates, reported in column (7), is 
statistically insignificant.
32 
4. IS THERE A ROLE FOR INSTITUTIONS? 
4.1. MORTGAGE MARKET AND CREDIT INSTITUTIONS 
This section asks whether financial and housing institutions can help predict the probability of house 
slumps bottoming out. We first focus on the IMF’s mortgage-market-development index and its 
subcomponents. This index is an aggregate of five indicators: (1) freedom of home equity 
withdrawals, (2) scope for prepaying mortgages without fees, (3) the typical loan-to-value ratio, (4) 
the typical length of mortgage loans and, (5) the development of secondary markets for mortgage 
loans. 
Mortgage markets were progressively deregulated starting at the beginning of the 1980s in most 
advanced countries. The U.S. and U.K. took the lead, followed by Canada, Australia and the Nordic 
countries. In other advanced countries, mainly Japan and Continental Europe, progress was slower. 
However, deregulation was largely complete in most of these countries by the beginning of the 1990s 
(IMF 2008). Given this, here we focus on just those slumps which took place after 1990.
33 
Most of these indicators of mortgage market development have a positive impact on the probability of 
slumps ending. Panel A of Table 7 shows these regressions. The largest effect is associated with the 
overall mortgage development index, but most of its subcomponents also have a positive impact on 
slump ends. The largest effect is associated with the freedom of home equity withdrawals, while the 
exception is the scope for prepaying mortgages without fees (refinance). For the latter, we find no 
relationship with the probability of house prices bottoming out. 
We next focus on ease of credit access. We measure this by constructing a dummy variable that splits 
the World Bank Doing Business country ranking for ease of obtaining credit at the median country. 
This World Bank ranking is based on indicators describing how well collateral and bankruptcy laws 
                                                            
31The source of these data is the BIS Locational Banking Statistics. 
32To check the robustness of these results, we also estimated a version including the current account balance as 
an additional control. This model yields coefficients for the rest-of-the-world house price variables that are of 
similar size. However, the inclusion of the current account balance makes these coefficients statistically 
insignificant. 
33Since the IMF reports these indicators for one point in time, some time in the 2000s, we are forced to assume 
that mortgage market institutions do not change over time. 11 
 
facilitate lending, and the coverage, scope and accessibility of credit information.
34 These rankings 
have been produced for recent years only, and here we take the ranking for 2010. Thus, our results 
should be interpreted with the caveat that, due to lack of data, we are forced to assume that these 
institutions have not changed over the 1990-2010 period. 
When this measure is included as an additional explanatory variable in the probit model, its associated 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that in countries where getting credit is 
easier, slumps are shorter (Table 7, Panel B). 
A fairly consistent message emerges from these exercises: more developed financial markets are 
associated with shorter slumps, all else equal.
35 
4.2. HOUSING-SECTOR INSTITUTIONS 
We also examine the impact of supply-side conditions in the housing and construction sector. We 
have information on housing supply responsiveness to changes in demand, the time required to obtain 
a building permit, government housing rent controls, and transaction costs for house buyers and 
sellers.
36  As before, we first explored the impact of these institutional variables individually. 
However, unlike in the case of the financial and mortgage market institutions, we did not find 
statistically significant effects.
37 On the other hand – and again in contrast with our findings regarding 
financial and mortgage institutions – we found consistent and strong effects of housing sector 
institutions on the impact of other variables, in particular our house price variables. These are 
reported in Panel C of Table 7. 
Our expectation is that, for a given housing price run-up, countries with more upwardly elastic 
housing supplies should exhibit larger price contractions than those with smaller supply elasticities. 
While house quantities do not adjust downward during house price slumps, they do adjust upwards 
during house price booms. In countries with more elastic housing supplies, therefore, house price run-
ups should lead to greater supply overhangs, requiring larger subsequent price adjustments to restore 
market equilibrium. The estimates in column (1) of Panel C are consistent with this reasoning. The 
more elastic is housing supply, the more negative is the effect of the previous house price run-up. The 
negative and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction term between the supply elasticity 
and the cumulative house price fall gives further support for our hypothesis. More specifically, this 
negative sign suggests that when the elasticity of house supply is high, the required adjustment in 
house prices to get the slump out of the way is larger. 
                                                            
34Although this variable relates more to obtaining credit for the purpose of doing business, we take it as a proxy 
for how easy is to obtain credit for housing. 
35We also looked at whether these financial market institutions influenced the impact of the other variables in 
our model. By and large, when we estimated models including not only the institutional variables, but their 
interactions with our four core variables, these interaction terms were statistically insignificant (results available 
on request from the authors). The exceptions were mostly to do with the impact of house price movements 
themselves. A bigger house price run-up lowers the probability of bottoming out by more in countries with more 
developed mortgage markets, while the impact of a given price adjustment on the probability of bottoming out is 
smaller. Ease of access to credit has no effect on the impact of other variables. 
36 For government housing rent controls we have a composite indicator of the extent of controls on rents. This 
measures how increases in rents are determined, and the permitted cost pass-through onto rents in each country. 
The indicator includes information on whether rent levels can be freely negotiated between the landlord and the 
tenant, the coverage of controls on rent levels, and the criteria for setting rent levels.  These institutional 
variables were obtained from OECD (2011). 
37Results available on request. 12 
 
Column (2) presents a similar model where the institutional variable is the number of days required to 
obtain a construction permit. As expected, this variable has the opposite effect to that of housing 
supply elasticities, since it is a proxy for an inelastic housing supply. Here, the effect of house price 
run-ups is smaller in countries where the time required to obtain a permit is longer. (The interaction 
effect between the house price run-up and the institutional variable is positive and statistically 
significant.) In addition, since a more inelastic supply is associated with smaller overhangs, the 
required house price adjustment to get the slump ended is smaller (the interaction effect with the 
cumulative price fall is positive and statistically significant). 
Rent controls are considered in column (3). Since house prices represent the discounted present value 
of future rent flows, institutions altering the responsiveness of rents to changes in macro or financial 
variables should also affect house prices. This model shows that when rent controls are high, the 
effect of house price run-ups on slump duration is smaller. (The coefficient associated with the 
interaction effect between this institution and the house price run-up is positive and statistically 
significant.) In relation to the cumulative house price adjustment, countries with rent controls required 
smaller house price adjustments. 
The final housing-sector institutional variable is transaction costs. The results in column (4) do not 
show any statistically significant effects associated with interaction terms between transactions costs 
and our other variables. 
In sum, different institutions influence the probability of housing slumps coming to an end in different 
ways. In countries with more flexible construction sectors, house price run-ups give rise to greater 
supply overhangs and thus require larger price declines in their wake. On the other hand, more 
flexible and well-developed financial institutions seem to be associated with shorter slumps. 
5. SHORT AND SHARP VERSUS GRADUAL SLUMPS 
There is little doubt that how and when this housing slump comes to an end will matter importantly 
for the timing and vigour of economic recovery. However, it is not clear whether allowing prices to 
fall of their own accord is better than intervening to slow their adjustment, for example by taking 
measures to prevent households in arrears on their mortgages from being thrown out of their homes.
38 
We therefore compare the experiences of economies in which house prices end up being lowered by 
the same amount, but over different periods. We estimate a panel vector autoregression model with 
the following structural form      ,           ,         ,      , , where    ,  is a vector that includes the 
real house price index and the three outcome variables: GDP, private consumption and investment, 
i.e.    ,            , ,      , ,     , ,    ,  .
39 Matrix    captures the contemporaneous relations 
between these four variables while      is the matrix polynomial in the lag operator   measuring the 
link between these variables and their lagged values. We set the lag length to be four quarters to 
account for seasonal effects.   ,  are fixed effects that we include to account for country-specific 
heterogeneity and country-specific linear trends.   ,  are the orthogonal structural shocks. We estimate 
the above model in its reduced form version    ,           ,         ,      , , where       
                                                            
38While the main political motivation of this may be to protect vulnerable households, by reducing the frequency 
of distress sales such policies may also moderate the decline in house prices. 




      ,      
    and   ,      
    ,  and use the coefficients in      to simulate the dynamic 
effects of slumps that have identical size but different durations.
40 
In order to simulate a slump with a shorter duration we alter the autoregressive coefficients in the 
house price equation. Specifically, we scale down the coefficients in the last row of     . In order to 
keep the slump size constant we calibrate the initial impulse accordingly. We also present an 
alternative approach in which we replace the coefficients in the last row of      with “real world” 
house price persistence using the autoregressive coefficients of the house price process in two distinct 
countries.
41 The first slump is constructed using data for Japanese house prices. As shown in Figure 1, 
these exhibit a considerable degree of persistence. To illustrate the impact of a sharp slump, we use 
Irish data. Figure 1 and current evidence from recent data releases suggest that the downward 
flexibility of Irish house prices, at least during the current slump, is high. 
Figure 4 shows dynamic simulations following the first strategy, while Figure 5 reports the associated 
cumulative responses. These show that the outcome variables fall faster during sharp house price 
slumps than during shallow slumps, which is hardly surprising. When the sharp slump is over, the 
outcome variables continue their convergence to the initial steady state but at a much slower pace. 
Although the outcome variables fall more slowly during a shallow slump, these negative trends last 
longer, since the slump also lasts longer. As a result, the assessment of whether it is more desirable to 
have a sharper or a shallower slump depends on the horizon that the policy maker is interested in. 
Figure 4 shows that the contraction in GDP is less substantial during the first 16 quarters in a shallow 
slump. However, in the long run a sharp slump may be more desirable than a shallow one. Figure 5 
shows that the cumulative GDP performance of the sharp slump is superior after 26 quarters. While 
shallow slumps are less painful in the short run, sharp slumps are better in the long run. By and large, 
these results carry over when we take real world coefficients to simulate house price dynamics. Once 
again, a short, sharp Irish slump is worse than a more protracted Japanese-style slump in the short run. 
However, Figures 6 and 7 show that an Irish-style price decline produces a better GDP and 
consumption response than a Japanese-style decline in the long run. However, the point estimates of 
the investment responses do not suggest a clear difference between the Irish and Japanese cases. 
6. THE LINK BETWEEN THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND THE HOUSING SECTOR 
Much literature shows that the financial system can act as an “accelerator”, amplifying shocks to 
housing markets in the upside of the cycle. When housing prices rise, banks make profits on their real 
estate investments. As a result, these better capitalized banks lend more to the housing market, and 
therefore contribute to further increases in house prices. However, our focus is on the financial-
system-house-price link during the down cycle. During slumps, can this financial accelerator go into 
reverse, such that falling house prices lead to a decline in lending, and hence further declines in house 
prices (along with falling levels of economic activity)?  
As a measure of the health of the banking system, we look at the level of private credit in the 
economy. We start by estimating a panel vector autoregression using the outcome variables employed 
                                                            
40We also compared slumps of identical duration, but different sizes. These results are not reported here for the 
simple reason that they are trivial: bigger slumps are worse. 
41These country-specific coefficients are estimated using four lags of house prices and four lags of the outcome 
variables as controls. In addition, we include a constant and a linear trend. 14 
 
in the previous section (GDP, consumption and investment), together with house prices. We now add 
private credit and the real mortgage interest rate as additional endogenous variables.
 42 Since we are 
interested in how these relationships change when house prices are slumping, we adapt the model so 
as to isolate the dynamics during slump episodes. To this end we include interaction terms with a 
dummy variable that takes the value one when house prices are not slumping, and zero otherwise. To 
split the sample between “on slump” and “off slump” dynamics we interact this dummy variable with 
all the lagged values of the endogenous variables and include these as additional explanatory variables 
in each equation.
43 
Figures 8-10 show the impulse-response functions for shocks to credit, interest rates and house prices. 
The available strategies for the identification of shocks in vector autoregression models include the 
narrative, sign restrictions, and structural approaches. The former requires narrative information on 
the dates of shocks for the different variables. Unfortunately, these data are not available for the 
shocks that we consider here. In any case, this strategy would be difficult to implement in the context 
of a panel vector autoregression model.
44 The last two approaches require theoretical models to 
motivate the restrictions that are needed for shock identification. The sign restriction approach uses 
theoretical models to motivate the assumptions regarding the predicted sign impact of shocks, as well 
as the “duration” of these restrictions, i.e. for how many periods these restrictions ought to hold. The 
structural approach implements short- and long-run constraints that are used to identify structural 
innovations. These approaches are not well suited for the analysis conducted here since we do not 
have a theoretical model to aid the identification of shocks in a country panel. With this in mind, we 
opt for implementing a recursive ordering. 
Following several papers focusing on the impact of monetary shocks, we order GDP before the 
interest rate.
45 Since consumption and investment are subcomponents of GDP, we order these in the 
first positions as well. The interest rate, house prices and credit are placed in the last three places. The 
resulting ordering is GDP, consumption, investment, interest rates, house prices, and credit. 
The focus of this section is on shocks to credit, interest rates and house prices. Thus, the above 
recursive ordering implies that credit affects the rest of the endogenous variables with one lag. It 
means that shifts in the mortgage interest rate can contemporaneously affect house prices and credit. It 
assumes that house prices can have a contemporaneous impact effect on credit. 
The rationale for placing credit after house prices is that we find (as shown next) that house prices 
cause credit and not the other way around. Placing the interest rate before house prices is theoretically 
sensible, given that house prices can be defined as the discounted present value of the stream of 
                                                            
42Due to data availability for credit, we estimate these models using annual data. The lag length is set to two. All 
models include country fixed effects and linear trends. 
43 We checked the performance of this model following two alternative strategies. First, we looked at the in-
sample fit in each equation of the system and found that the model fits the data well. Its equations exhibit small 
mean squared errors and high adjusted R-squares. Second, we studied its out-of-sample performance by looking 
at forecasts at different horizons. We computed the mean forecast error, mean absolute error, root mean square 
error and the Theil’s U statistic for each equation in the system. This model does a good job in producing 
forecasts.  The only exception is the credit equation, for which we are unable to beat the naive forecasting 
approach for horizons greater than one period. 
44 It has been used in the context of monetary and fiscal shocks in single-country models. 
45 One example following this strategy for GDP and the policy rate is Christiano et al (2005). 15 
 
income that houses produce. We do not have a strong rationale for placing the interest rate before 
credit, since intuition suggests that causality can go in both directions. 
Figure 8 shows that a positive shock to credit has a delayed positive effect on house prices and 
consumption and a negative effect on the interest rate. GDP and investment, in contrast, are unaltered 
by this shock. When we compute these responses for periods when house price are slumping, the 
results are qualitatively similar, but the responses of consumption and house prices are now stronger.
46 
This suggests that the link between bank credit and house prices is stronger during slumps.  
Figure 9 presents the responses to a negative shock in the mortgage interest rate. As expected, the 
impact is expansionary. However, these responses are smaller when house prices are slumping. 
Together with the previous finding of a stronger effect of credit on house prices during a slump, this 
points to the existence of credit rationing during periods of distress: households might wish to respond 
to lower interest rates by borrowing more, but are in many cases unable to do so.
47 
Figure 10 looks at shocks to house prices.
48 In line with the previous findings, the effect of a shock to 
house prices on credit is greater when house prices are slumping. This provides further evidence that 
the link between credit and house prices tightens during slumps; the financial accelerator linking these 
two variables appears to be even stronger on the downside than on the upside.
49 
It seems clear that causation runs predominantly from house prices to credit rather than the other way 
around. Table 8 presents a set of tests that look for evidence of causation between house prices and 
credit. Row (1) presents Granger causality tests while the other rows are tests of joint significance that 
also include contemporaneous values of credit (or house prices) in the set of explanatory variables. 
Thus, these tests are complementary since they do not test causality. Here we test whether current and 
past values of these variables have the power to explain the other variable. 
Row (1) shows that we can reject the null of house prices not causing credit. In contrast, we are not 
able to reject the null hypothesis of credit not causing house prices. This is in line with Gerlach and 
Peng (2005), who find evidence of house prices causing credit and not the other way around in Hong 
Kong. 
In sum, it appears that the correlation between credit and house prices becomes tighter during house 
price slumps, with the causation going more from falling house prices to falling credit. But while 
credit may not directly drive house prices during slumps, Figure 8 indicates that shocks to credit end 
up affecting house prices indirectly, via their effects on the rest of the economy. This is a cost of 
                                                            
46Although we note that in both Figures 8 and 10, the confidence bands between the baseline and slump 
responses generally overlap. 
47There is abundant evidence to suggest that this is happening in contemporary Ireland, for example. 
48As before, we study this using the full sample as well as focusing on slump periods. 
49 We checked the robustness of these results implementing four alternative specifications. First we estimated a 
more parsimonious model including only the interest rate, house prices, and credit. Second, we estimated a 
version of the model with the previous three variables and GDP. Third, we estimated a six-variable model and 
identified shocks flipping the position of the interest rate and credit variables. More precisely, we put credit in 
the third position and the interest rate in the sixth position. Finally, we estimated the model excluding crisis 
years, taking into account the possibility that recent crises may have generated structural breaks in the 
relationships between these variables. The results reported here are robust to all these alterations of the model. 
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allowing house prices to fall rapidly during a slump, since it opens the possibility of negative 
feedbacks from falling house prices to falling credit, and on to further falls in house prices. That said, 
the evidence presented earlier suggests that on average, it is better to get the required house price 
adjustment over and done with, once a housing bubble has burst.  
This suggests the optimal set of policies might involve allowing property prices to find their new 
equilibrium level but simultaneously restructuring the financial sector in such a way as to permit the 
resumption of private credit flows as speedily as possible. There also seems to be an important role 
for supportive macroeconomic policies, since low real interest rates and the resumption of GDP 
growth can both help in bringing about the end of housing slumps, and thus in breaking any negative 
feedback loops linking house prices and the financial sector. 
7. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
We have presented a parsimonious model of the determinants of the end of house price slumps, 
focusing on four variables – the extent of the prior house-price boom, the post-boom slump in prices, 
GDP growth as a measure of the state of the overall economy, and mortgage interest rates.  As shown, 
that model can be used to forecast the likelihood of slumps now coming to an end.  We find that this 
is now most likely in the U.S. and Spain, although even here the estimated probabilities are still 
relatively low and subject to a substantial degree of uncertainty. We find that the probability of 
housing slumps coming to an end, in these and other countries, in the not-too-distant future, will 
depend importantly on the kind of GDP growth rates and mortgage interest rates that eventuate. 
Mortgage interest rates are, according to our model, the single most robust predictor of the probability 
of a house price slump ending.  This observation was one of the popularly-voiced justifications for the 
Federal Reserve System’s first and second rounds of quantitative easing in 2008-10, and it is similarly 
a rationale for the recently launched Operation Twist.  By purchasing longer-term government 
securities, the Fed has attempted to put downward pressure on long-term interest rates generally and 
mortgage interest rates in particular, with the goal of helping to revive the housing market.  
In addition, the Fed intervened directly in markets for agency residential mortgage backed securities 
linked to housing finance, and the Fed committed in September 2011, in connection with its Operation 
Twist, to purchase additional mortgage-linked securities as its existing holdings matured. Chairman 
Bernanke himself distinguished quantitative easing, which was designed to expand the supply of 
money broadly defined by purchasing treasury and related securities in a manner not explicitly 
designed to target a particular market, in much the same the same manner that a reduction in the 
central bank’s standard policy instruments were normally designed to operate, from “credit easing,” 
which focused on interventions in specific credit markets and instruments, such as securitized 
mortgages, designed to re-liquify those particular markets and reduce the cost of specific kinds of 
credit, notably including mortgage credit. 
Our results suggest that real rather than nominal mortgage rates are what appear to matter in this 
context.  This suggests that insofar as the central bank can avoid deflation and, further, actively push 
up the inflation rate without putting commensurate upward pressure on nominal rates, central bank 
policy can increase the likelihood of a revival of the housing market.   Insofar as the decline in real 17 
 
housing prices since the peak is another significant determinant of the probability of the housing 
market bottoming out, higher inflation which means lower real housing prices, ceteris paribus, has a 
second separate effect working in the same direction. 
Does this mean, more generally, that economic policy makers and monetary policy makers in 
particular should adjust their instruments with the goal of bringing mortgage rates down when 
confronted with a housing slump?  The notion that the central bank should respond, either with 
conventional instruments or unconventional operations, to movements in asset prices – whether 
housing prices or other asset prices – remains controversial.  The controversy is typically framed as 
whether central banks should lean against pronounced increases in asset prices on the grounds that 
these could place financial stability at risk.  Prior to the global credit crisis, the consensus was that 
central banks should focus on maintaining low and stable inflation.  They should react to asset prices 
only insofar as asset-price movements had implications for the inflation rate and short run movements 
in the output gap (this view was known as the “Jackson Hole consensus”).  There may have been a 
handful of dissenters (see inter alia Borio and Lowe 2004, Disyatat 2005, White 2008 for example), 
but a broad-based professional consensus, it is fair to say, there nonetheless was. 
Post-crisis the consensus has shifted toward the view that asset-price movements with potential 
implications for financial stability cannot be treated with neglect.  Policy makers may not be able to 
identify bubbles with certainty, but they still need to make a judgment about whether sharp increases 
in asset prices are evidence of mounting financial risks – whether they are associated with dangerous 
increases in leverage and declining credit quality.  And where they see evidence of this association 
they should act preemptively.  (For a statement of this new conventional wisdom see CIEPR 2011.) 
What is true of sharp asset price increases is true also, we would argue, of sharp asset price 
reductions.  Policy makers cannot treat sharp falls in housing prices with benign neglect when they 
pose a threat to economic and financial stability.  But this does not imply that they should respond 
mechanically.  They must form a judgment about whether those price declines are having a serious 
negative effect on consumer confidence.  They must ask whether this is undermining macroeconomic 
stability by, inter alia, depressing spending and raising the danger of deflation.  They need to make a 
judgment as to whether house price declines, by causing losses for lenders, pose a potential threat to 
financial stability.  And where they reach positive answers, it is appropriate that they respond in ways 
with the potential to reduce mortgage rates and/or increase the supply of mortgage credit, thereby 
raising the likelihood of the house-price slump coming to an end. 
At what point should they respond?  Our results suggest that house prices have a tendency to fall 
further when a slump has already been underway for an extended period.  After some point, the 
evidence suggests, price falls can elicit further price falls in a vicious spiral out of which it becomes 
hard for the market to break.  Since falling house prices lead to falling levels of private credit, this in 
turn raises the risk of the kind of destabilizing macroeconomic and financial effects described in the 
previous paragraph.  Again, this is an argument for the authorities to act preemptively.  They should 
intervene, perhaps with reductions in policy rates and, where they have spent their interest-rate 
ammunition, with quantitative and credit easing in order to prevent the housing market from slipping 
into this kind of self-reinforcing downward price spiral.  This is analogous to the argument that policy 18 
 
makers should react preemptively to falls in the economy-wide rate of inflation in order to prevent the 
economy from entering a deflationary trap from which it then becomes difficult to escape. 
Are policy makers capable of recognizing this kind of situation?  Economic science provides an 
answer: maybe.   Some of our models identify fairly precisely the point where a housing slump 
becomes self-reinforcing and hence a potential danger to the economy.  Other specifications do not.  
But this uncertainty does not relieve policy makers of responsibility for making a judgment and, 
where appropriate, of acting. 
Macroeconomic policy makers, of course, should not be concerned with the housing market for its 
own sake.  Rather they should be concerned about the implications of the housing slump for the 
economy as a whole.  Our analysis confirms that the same price adjustment stretched out over a 
longer period tends to limit the damage to growth in the short run while accentuating it in the longer 
run.  A sharp downward adjustment in prices, Irish style, leads to a sharper short-run recession but an 
earlier recovery than a more moderate “Japanese style” decline in prices of the same cumulative 
magnitude. 
Which path is preferable will depend on policy makers’ discount rate: the higher the rate the greater 
the likelihood that the Japanese alternative will be preferred.  Our estimates suggest that policy 
makers will be indifferent between the two paths when the discount rate is 6.9% (from Figure 4) and 
14.9% (from Figure 6) percent. For lower discount rates, policy makers should favour the Irish 
alternative. Of course, there may well be a difference between the optimal social discount rate, and the 
subjective discount rates of politicians hoping to get re-elected: while the ‘correct’ response might be 
to get the required house price adjustment over quickly, this may not in fact be what we observe. 
Housing market interventions that delay downward house price adjustment thus will appeal to 
governments worried about households with negative equity and about the balance sheets of financial 
institutions. During the Great Depression in the United States, for example, the federal government 
established the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation in order to break the cycle of forced sales and 
declining house prices and keep home owners in their homes. While the policy was successful in 
arresting the decline in house prices and maintaining the level of home ownership, it had no impact on 
home building, which is what matters from the perspective of economic recovery. Not that is this 
particularly surprising, since most HOLC loans were advanced in those regions were housing markets 
were most distressed – which is where the housing supply overhang was greatest (Courtemanche and 
Snowdon 2010). 
One of our findings is that mortgage market deregulation increases the probability of housing slumps 
coming to an end.  Slumps are more likely to end when loan-to-equity ratios are high, term to maturity 
is long, mortgages are securitized, and homeowners are able to withdraw equity.  These are structures 
that are likely to make mortgage credit more freely available, something that will make it easier for 
potential purchasers to enter the market when prices are weak.  Of course, many of these features 
were also associated, with good reason, with the problems leading to the housing bubble and 
subsequent crash in countries like the United States.  Low loan-to-value ratios allowed homeowners to 
get into houses they could not afford and quickly left them under water when prices declined.  The 
opportunity to withdraw equity when price were rising led some homeowners to use their houses as 19 
 
automatic teller machines, again raising the danger of default and foreclosure if prices fell.  
Securitization created agency problems between mortgage originators, distributors and investors that 
artificially depressed the price of mortgage finance, feeding the housing boom, and depressed credit 
quality. 
We do not dispute any of this.  But once a slump is underway low down-payment requirements, the 
availability of long-dated mortgages, and extensive mortgage securitization that increase the 
availability of mortgage credit raise the probability that buyers will reenter the market.  This suggests 
that harsh, across-the-board regulation is not the answer.  Better would be for regulators to vary loan-
to-value ratios over the cycle, raising them in housing booms (as suggested after a fashion by 
Geanakoplos 2010), in much the manner that it is now argued that they should raise banks’ capital-to-
asset ratios during credit booms.
50 
More fundamentally, this perspective suggests that policy makers should attempt to balance the 
advantages of tighter regulation, which will help to prevent problems from developing subsequently, 
with the advantages of deregulation, among whose benefits are that it should make it easier for the 
housing market to recover from a slump.   The idea that regulators should seek a balance is of course a 
commonplace, but the observation is no less valid for the fact.  
More generally, policy makers face a number of delicate balancing acts during house price slumps. 
The first is achieving a balance between excessive and insufficient regulation, as just mentioned. The 
second is achieving a balance regarding the optimal speed of adjustment of house prices. In those 
countries that have experienced the largest run-ups, such as Spain or Ireland, it is important that 
property prices be allowed to adjust downward so as to increase the likelihood that the slumps will 
come to an end. In favour of speedy adjustment is our finding that short sharp house price slumps are 
less damaging for the economy in the long run, even if they are more immediately painful; and our 
finding that there is a point in time after which slumps can become self-reinforcing. Germany, and 
especially Japan, provide us with cautionary examples in this regard.  
But falling house prices can impair bank balance sheets and lead to falling levels of credit to the 
economy. There may thus be a danger that economies can be locked into a vicious circle of falling 
property prices driving falling bank lending, driving further declines in property prices. It is 
important, therefore, to ensure that price adjustments in the housing market be accompanied by 
supportive banking and macroeconomic policies.  Limiting the impairment of bank balance sheets and 
disruptions to the provision of bank credit to the housing market will be critically important.  This 
points to the importance of conducting realistic stress tests of bank balance sheets with respect to 
sharp declines in housing prices during boom times and early and concerted bank recapitalization 
where necessary in response to slumps.   
Low real interest rates can help in ensuring that house prices bottom out, implying that central bankers 
should keep nominal interest rates low and avoid deflation. Avoiding deflation suggests that a 
moderate level of inflation can help to bring housing slumps to an end by further reducing real interest 
rates where nominal rates have been pushed to the lower bound.     
                                                            
50 This would not be easy politically, however. 20 
 
Table 1: House price slumps 
 
No. Country  Start date  End date 
     
Slump Growth 
year Quarter year quarter size  afterwards 
                 
             
1 Australia  1974 1 1978 4 -17.5 1.7 
2 Australia  1986 2 1987 3 -8.4 4.0 
3 Australia  1989 2 1996 4 -7.3 1.1 
4 Australia  2007 4 2009 1 -10.1 3.7 
5 Belgium  1970 1 1971 3 -8.2 1.2 
6 Belgium  1979 3 1985 2 -35.6 0.9 
7 Canada  1976 1 1984 3 -21.8 0.5 
8 Canada  1989 4 1991 3 -12.3 0.6 
9 Canada  2007 4 2009 1 -11.6 3.7 
10 Denmark  1973 3 1974 3 -13.7 3.2 
11 Denmark  1979 2 1982 4 -36.0 4.9 
12 Denmark  1986 1 1993 2 -35.6 3.4 
13 Denmark  2007 2 2009 2 -21.1 0.3 
14 Finland  1970 4 1972 2 -6.8 3.6 
15 Finland  1974 1 1979 4 -26.5 0.4 
16 Finland  1989 2 1995 4 -50.8 3.0 
17 Finland  1999 4 2001 4 -5.3 1.7 
18 Finland  2007 3 2009 1 -8.9 2.1 
19 France  1970 1 1971 2 -6.2 1.7 
20 France  1980 4 1984 4 -19.2 0.4 
21 France  1991 1 1997 1 -16.6 0.7 
22 France  2007 2 2008 4 -13.8 2.1 
23 Germany  1975 1 1976 3 -5.1 0.7 
24 Germany  1981 2 1989 2 -14.2 1.4 
25 Germany  1994 4 2009 3 -25.0 0.04 
26 Ireland  1970 4 1973 2 -9.6 0.9 
27 Ireland  1979 2 1987 2 -32.0 1.4 
28 Ireland  2007 2 ongoing  -29.5  
29 Italy  1981 2 1986 3 -36.3 0.7 
30 Italy  1992 4 1996 1 -12.5 0.5 
31 Italy  1997 2 1999 4 -3.4 0.3 
32 Japan  1973 4 1978 1 -28.7 0.9 
33 Japan  1991 2 2009 4 -42.5 0.5 
                       
             
Note: The size of Ireland’s ongoing slump size is computed using 2010q3 house price data. 
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Table 1 con’t: House price slumps 
 
No. Country  Start date  End date 
     
Slump Growth 
year quarter year quarter size  afterwards 
                 
             
34 Netherlands  1978 2 1986 1 -50.3 1.4 
35 Netherlands  2007 3 ongoing  -12.2  
36 New  Zealand  1974 3 1980 4 -38.2 3.3 
37 New  Zealand  1984 2 1986 4 -8.3 2.9 
38 New  Zealand  1990 1 1992 1 -7.9 0.4 
39 New  Zealand  1997 2 2000 4 -7.2 0.6 
40 New  Zealand  2007 3 2009 1 -14.6 1.1 
41 Norway  1970 1 1973 1 -5.1 1.0 
42 Norway  1980 2 1983 4 -9.1 4.0 
43 Norway  1987 2 1993 1 -41.4 3.5 
44 Norway  2007 2 2008 4 -14.3 2.5 
45 Spain  1978 2 1982 2 -35.0 2.0 
46 Spain  1991 4 1997 4 -24.1 1.5 
47 Spain  2007 2 ongoing  -14.4  
48 Sweden  1970 1 1971 3 -7.0 0.8 
49 Sweden  1979 3 1986 2 -40.0 1.7 
50 Sweden  1990 1 1995 4 -31.9 0.6 
51 Sweden  2007 3 2009 1 -9.0 2.0 
52 Switzerland  1973 1 1977 1 -27.4 0.3 
53 Switzerland  1989 4 2000 4 -36.8 0.6 
54 United  Kingdom  1973 3 1978 1 -32.8 3.6 
55 United  Kingdom  1989 3 1996 2 -31.4 1.7 
56 United  Kingdom  2007 3 2009 2 -16.1 0.8 
57 United  States  1979 2 1983 4 -9.4 0.4 
58 United  States  1989 3 1996 4 -11.6 0.7 
59 United  States  2006 1 ongoing  -38.3  
                       
             
Note: The sizes of the ongoing slumps are calculated using house price 2010 q2 data for Netherlands 
and United States and 2010q3 data for Spain. 
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Table 2: Baseline probit model 
 
 Coefficient 
Semi-elasticities. Variables evaluated at:  






        
House price 
run-up  -0.002  -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
  (0.002)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Cum. price fall  0.018***  0.041***  0.042***  0.038***  0.043*** 
  (0.006)  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
GDP  growth  0.154***  0.345*** 0.348*** 0.319*** 0.354*** 
  (0.049)  (0.110) (0.112) (0.112) (0.109) 
Interest  rate  -0.085***  -0.189*** -0.191*** -0.175*** -0.195*** 
  (0.025)  (0.057) (0.058) (0.044) (0.069) 
        
                 
Obs.  1126  1126 1126 1126 1126 
Pseudo R
2  0.09  0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 
Prob.    0.033 0.030 0.049 0.028 
                 
 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust standard 
errors reported in parentheses.  23 
 
Table 3: Predicted end probabilities for ongoing slumps 
 
                 
Country 
Latest GDP  Interest  rate 
values  Min Max Min Max 
                 
                 
country  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
                 
       
Ireland 0.118*  0.051  0.170**  0.122*  0.028 
The Netherlands  0.046*  0.022  0.095**  0.065*  0.011 
Spain 0.090*** 0.045**  0.164*** 0.111***  0.022*** 
United States  0.166*** 0.081*** 0.247*** 0.241***  0.068*** 
       
                 
Baseline  0.032***     
                 
 
Note: Monte Carlo simulated probabilities using Clarify software. These are obtained by evaluating 
the baseline probit model at different values for all explanatory variables. Column (1) shows the 
slump ends probabilities when the baseline probit model is evaluated at the latest value of each 
explanatory variable by country. Baseline, however, reports the estimated probability for variables set 
at the sample mean. We include this for comparison purposes. Columns (2) and (3) report different 
simulations for two alternative values of GDP growth rates: -2.35% and 2.37%. Columns (4) and (5) 
report probabilities using 0.07% and 9.14% as the extreme real mortgage interest rate values. These 
values are taken from the dataset used to estimate the baseline probit model.  *, ** and *** indicate 
the statistical significant of these point estimates at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 4: Robustness checks 
 
Panel A: fixed effects and instrumental variables 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
   Baseline  no FE  cFE yFE  IV  No GDP 
                 
House price run-
up  -0.002  -0.002 -0.005* -0.003 -0.003* 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Cum. price fall  0.018***  0.009*  0.026***  0.018***  0.020*** 
  (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
GDP growth  0.154***  0.151***  0.204***  0.135   
  (0.049) (0.048) (0.059) (0.160)   
Interest rate  -0.085***  -0.029*  -0.067**  -0.085***  -0.081*** 
  (0.025) (0.015) (0.031) (0.024) (0.023) 
                 
Obs.  1126 1126 1126 1122 1126 
Pseudo R
2  0.09  0.03  0.24      0.07 
 
Panel B: different slump end definitions 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
   Baseline  end t, t-1  end t, t-1, t-2  No ongoing  Large 
                 
House price run-
up  -0.002 -0.004**  -0.003** -0.001 -0.010** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) 
Cum.  Price  fall 0.018*** 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.019*** 0.077*** 
  (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.019) 
GDP growth  0.154***  0.028  0.042  0.152***  0.289*** 
  (0.049) (0.049) (0.045) (0.050) (0.085) 
Interest  rate  -0.085*** -0.093*** -0.084*** -0.097*** -0.221*** 
  (0.025) (0.019) (0.016) (0.027) (0.057) 
                 
Obs.  1126 1126 1126 1066  768 
Pseudo R
2  0.09 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.24 
 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust standard 
errors reported in parentheses. 
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Table 5: Duration model 
 
     
House price run-up  0.0002 
 (0.003) 
Cum. Price fall 
 -0.0003 
 (0.001) 
GDP growth  0.1876* 
 (0.101) 
Interest rate  -0.1342***
 (0.051) 
     




     
 
Note: Coefficients from Cox regression model using Breslow method for ties. Country fixed effects 
included. Link and Schoenfeld residuals tests indicate that the proportional hazard assumption is 
satisfied, i.e. the log hazard ratio is constant over time. Cumulative house price fall is interacted with a 
linear trend. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Robust 
standard errors reported in parentheses. 
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Table 6: Additional specifications, semi-elasticities evaluated at variables’ means 
Panel A 
              
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
              
      
Bubble -0.006  -0.001  0.001  -0.005 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Cum. price fall  0.042***  -0.018  -0.036  0.073** 
  (0.013) (0.025) (0.024) (0.036) 
GDP growth  0.352***  0.342***  0.328**  0.348*** 
  (0.115) (0.111) (0.149) (0.111) 
Interest  rate  -0.192*** -0.174*** -0.178*** -0.189*** 
  (0.058) (0.057) (0.060) (0.057) 
HP volatility  -0.004*       
 (0.003)       
Duration   0.092**  0.171***   
   (0.039)  (0.050)  
Duration
2     -0.001*  
     (0.001)  
(Cum. price fall)
2      -0.001 
       (0.001) 
              
Obs.  1118 1126 1126 1126 
Pseudo R
2  0.09 0.13 0.14 0.09 
              
 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust standard 
errors reported in parentheses. 
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Table 6: Additional specifications, semi-elasticities evaluated at variables’ means 
Panel B 
                       
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
                       
         
House  price  run-up -0.003 -0.004 -0.003  -0.008*  -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Cum.  price  fall  0.052*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
GDP  growth  0.459*** 0.436*** 0.452*** 0.329*** 0.310*** 0.305*** 0.302*** 
  (0.151) (0.142) (0.142) (0.114) (0.113) (0.111) (0.112) 
Interest  rate  -0.275*** -0.293*** -0.307*** -0.162*** -0.178*** -0.188*** -0.184*** 
  (0.071) (0.075) (0.068) (0.058) (0.059) (0.058) (0.060) 
Stmkt.  growth    0.023*        
  (0.014)        
Stmkt.  growth  (t+1)    0.039***       
    (0.012)       
Stmkt. growth (t+2)      0.030**         
     (0.013)      
Current  account     0.156***     
      (0.056)     
RoWavHPg       0.249*    
       (0.146)    
RoWfinHPg        0.191*  0.235 
        (0.100)  (0.148) 
R o W          0 . 0 9 3  
D(avHPg-finHPg)         (0.228) 
         
         
                       
Obs.  1023 1020 1016 1126 1126 1126 1126 
Pseudo R
2  0.13 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.10 
                       
 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust standard 




Table 7: The effect of institutions 
Panel A: Mortgage market development 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 










length  Securitisation 
 
                    
           
House price 
run-up  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  0.003 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.005) 
Cum. Price fall  0.028***  0.028***  0.028***  0.028***  0.028***  0.035* 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)  (0.010) (0.010)  (0.019) 
GDP  growth  0.109 0.109 0.109  0.109  0.109  0.199 
  (0.086) (0.086) (0.086)  (0.086) (0.086)  (0.133) 
Interest rate  -0.233***  -0.233***  -0.233*** -0.233*** -0.233***  -0.196*** 
  (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)  (0.051) (0.051)  (0.055) 
Institution 6.747***  1.957***  -0.804  0.196***  0.391***  0.729** 
  (2.512) (0.729) (0.532)  (0.073) (0.146)  (0.340) 
         
Obs.  575 575 575  575  575  431 
Pseudo R
2  0.210 0.210 0.210  0.210  0.210  0.225 
                    
 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust standard 
errors reported in parentheses. Models estimated using 1990-2010 data.  29 
 
Table 7: The effect of institutions 
Panel B: Ease of credit access 
     
  Ease to get  
 credit 
  
     
House price run-up  -0.002 
 (0.003) 
Cum. Price fall  0.028*** 
 (0.010) 
GDP growth  0.109 
 (0.086) 









Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust standard 
errors reported in parentheses. Model estimated using 1990-2010 data.  30 
 
Table 7: The effect of institutions 
Panel C: Housing-sector institutions 
    (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
 Supply  Construction  Rent  Transaction 
 elasticity  permit  controls  costs 
              
       
House price run-
up  0.019**  -0.047** -0.012 -0.014 
  (0.008) (0.021) (0.008)  (0.011) 
Cum. Price fall  0.174***  -0.068  -0.028  0.002 
  (0.041) (0.048) (0.025)  (0.039) 
GDP  growth  -0.321 0.259 -0.048  0.425* 
  (0.257) (0.293) (0.126)  (0.245) 
Interest  rate  -0.418*** -0.034  -0.140 -0.279* 
  (0.106) (0.229) (0.098)  (0.152) 
Institution 5.894  -0.969  -1.830  -0.143 
  (3.663) (0.831) (1.640)  (0.200) 
Ins. X House 
price  run-up  -0.028***  0.013** 0.012* 0.001 
  (0.010) (0.005) (0.006)  (0.001) 
Ins. X Cum. 
Price fall  -0.133***  0.047***  0.068***  0.004 
  (0.038) (0.015) (0.026)  (0.005) 
Ins. X GDP 
growth  0.498* -0.040 0.148*  -0.046 
  (0.261) (0.091) (0.086)  (0.036) 
Inst. X int rate  0.057  -0.085  -0.072  0.001 
  (0.112) (0.060) (0.073)  (0.017) 
        
Obs.  575 575 575  575 
Pseudo R
2  0.292 0.302 0.262  0.234 
              
 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust standard 
errors reported in parentheses. Models estimated using 1990-2010 data. 
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Table 8: The effect of credit on house prices and house prices on credit during slumps 
        
  Ho: Credit does not  Ho: House prices do not  






        
(1) Granger causality test (joint 
significance of two lags of credit 
or house prices). The set of 
controls includes lagged values 
of other endogenous variables. 
0.29 0.08 
 
(2) Joint significance of 
contemporaneous and two lags 
of credit or house prices. The set 
of controls includes lagged 




(3) Joint significance of 
contemporaneous and two lags 
of credit or house prices. The set 
of controls includes current and 
lagged values of the other 
endogenous variables. 
0.50 0.05 
    
        
 
Note: the controls included as additional explanatory variables for credit and house price equations 
are the other endogenous variables included in the model, i.e. GDP, consumption, investment and the 
interest rate.  
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Figure 1: House price indices 
Note: House price indices are in log scale (base 1971:1=100). Source: Bank of International 
Settlements (BIS). Vertical lines indicate the end of house price slumps as defined in Section 3. 
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Figure 1 ‘cont: House price indices 
Note: House price indices are in log scale (base 1971:1=100). Source: Bank of International 
Settlements (BIS). Vertical lines indicate the end of house price slumps as defined in Section 3. 
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Figure 1 ‘cont: House price indices 
Note: House price indices are in log scale (base 1971:1=100). Source: Bank of International 
Settlements (BIS). Vertical lines indicate the end of house price slumps as defined in Section 3. 
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Figure 2: Simulations. Probability of slump ends. 
 
Note: Density functions for simulated probabilities of slump ends. These are generated by evaluating 





Figure 3: Simulations. Probability of slump ends. 
GDP scenarios 
 






Note: Density functions for simulated probabilities of slump ends using the baseline probit model. 
Solid black lines are generated by setting the core variables to their latest value in each country. GDP 
scenarios are constructed by replacing the latest GDP growth value by two alternative values. Dashed 
lines correspond to a GDP growth rate of -2.35% while dotted lines plot the probability corresponding 
to a growth rate of 2.37%. For the interest rate scenarios, we followed a similar approach using 0.07% 
and 9.14% as the two alternative real mortgage interest rates. The former is represented by dashed 
lines and the latter by dotted lines. All values for the construction of these scenarios are taken from 









Note: Solid lines are the simulations for the shallow slump (the baseline model). Dashed blue lines are the 
simulations for the sharp slump. This is generated by scaling down the autoregressive coefficients in the house 
price equation by a factor of 0.9. Error bands are the 16
th and 84








Note: Solid lines are the simulations for the shallow slump (the baseline model). Dashed blue lines are the 
simulations for the sharp slump. This is generated by scaling down the autoregressive coefficients in the house 
price equation by a factor of 0.9. Error bands are the 16
th and 84




Figure 6: shallow slump (Japan) vs. sharp slump (Ireland) 
 
 
Note: Dotted black lines are simulations using Japanese house price coefficients. Dashed blue lines are 
simulations using Irish house price coefficients. Error bands are the 16
th and 84




Figure 7: shallow slump (Japan) vs. sharp slump (Ireland), cumulative responses 
 
 
Note: Dotted black lines are simulations using Japanese house price coefficients. Dashed blue lines are 
simulations using Irish house price coefficients. Error bands are the 16
th and 84
th percentiles of the impulse-
response distribution.   41 
 
Figure 8: Responses to credit shock: baseline vs. slump 
 
Note: Solid lines are the responses of the baseline model. Dashed lines represent the during slump dynamic 
responses. Error bands are the 16
th and 84
th percentiles of the impulse-response distribution. 
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Figure 9: Responses to interest rate shock: baseline vs. slump 
 
Note: Solid lines are the responses of the baseline model. Dashed lines represent the during slump dynamic 
responses. Error bands are the 16
th and 84
th percentiles of the impulse-response distribution. 
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Figure 10: Responses to house price shock: baseline vs. slump 
 
Note: Solid lines are the responses of the baseline model. Dashed lines represent the during slump dynamic 
responses. Error bands are the 16
th and 84
th percentiles of the impulse-response distribution. 
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APPENDIX: DATA SOURCES 
House prices are inflation adjusted. The source of these data is the Bank of International Settlements 
(BIS). The source of real GDP growth is the OECD Economic Outlook No. 86 (December 2009). 
Mortgage interest rates are from International Financial Statistics (IMF). The source of interbank 
interest rate data is Global Financial Data. Long- and short-term government bond yields are from the 
OECD Economic Outlook No. 86 (December 2009). Credit is claims on the private sector by deposit 
money banks, from Becket al. (2010). To measure inflation we take the CPI growth rate. The source 
of these data is the OECD Economic Outlook No. 86 (December 2009). The source for total stock 
market return indices is Global Financial Data. The source of the investment, consumption and 
current account data is the OECD Economic Outlook No. 86 (December 2009). We obtain the 
Mortgage Market Development Index and its subcomponents from the IMF World Economic 
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